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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

G & G MINING COMPANY,
Petitioner
-vs.~r1\_X COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Case
No. 8595

Respondent's Briel
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Tax Commission can agree generally with the
Statement of Facts contained in Petitioners' brief. However, it should be pointed out regarding the statements
therein relating to the computation of the tax due that
the accountant for Petitioners, Mr. Moffat, stated that
during 1954 the Petitioners delivered to the buying station ore valuing $1,352,080.95. (Tr. 62) He also testified that the Petitioners received $105,640.27 as hauling
allowance on the ore delivered during 1954 (Tr. 62),
while it actually cost the Petitioners $144,913.27 to ship
this ore.

1
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After allowing a specific exemption of $50,000, there
remains a net amount of $1,262,807.95. This net amount,
representing the ore sold during 1954, will produce a tax
of $12,628.08.
The above figures concern only the sales of ore by
Petitioners during 1954. The Petitioners also sold some
ore during 1953. On July 21, 1955, the Petitioners submitted a return based on their sales during 1953 (Tr. 106),
and they paid $9,697.14 as the tax thereon. (Tr. 21) Inasmuch as this tax was paid on sales for a prior year, it has
no bearing upon the amount to be determined as the tax
due on sales during 1954.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PETITIONERS \:VERE PERSONS ENGAGED
IN THE BUSINESS OF MINING AND
PRODUCING ORE IN THE STATE OF
UTAH.
POINT II
THE T ...L\.X IS NOT ILLEGAL:
(A) THE ASSESS~IENT WAS MADE AS
PROVIDED BYLAW.
(B) IT IS NOT l\IAND.A_TORY THAT THE
TAX BE FIXED ON OR BEFORE
THE D.A. TE SPECIFIED IN THE
MINE OCCUPATION TAX.
2
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POINT III
THE ASSESSlVIENT WAS NOT CONTRARY
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.
POINT IV
THE T1-\_X WAS

PROP~JRL)r

COMPUTED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PETITIONERS WERE PERSONS ENGAGED
IN THE BUSINESS OF MINING AND
PRODUCING ORE IN THE STATE OF
UTAH.
The Tax Commission v;ill readily concede that it has
no authority to assess or collect any tax except in accordance vvith the authority granted by the State Legislature.
The tax liability here involved concerns the Mine Occupation Tax imposed by Sections 59-5-66 to 82, inclusive,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 59-5-67, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, provides in part as follows :
'' ... Every person engaged in the business of
mining or producing ore . . . in this state shall
pay to the State of Utah an occupation tax equal
to one per cent of the gross amount received for
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold ... ''
Thus, it will be seen that this is a tax imposed upon persons who are engaged in the business of mining and that
the tax is measured by the amount of ore sold. In order to
3
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be liable for a tax it is only necessary that a person (1)
be engaged in the business of mining or producing ore,
and (2) that he sell ore so produced. The petitioners in
this case have argued that no tax is due from one who is
not in the business of mining ore. This the Tax Commission will concede. However, in its decision No. 166 the
Tax Commission expressly found "that the petitioners
\Vere engaged in the business of mining or producing ore
on February 11, 1953, and continuously thereafter until
November 19, 1954. '' ( Tr. 70)
The evidence shows that the Petitioner submitted a.
tax return and paid the amount of $9,697.14 as a tax on
their sales during 1953. (Tr. 22) No return was submitted
to the State Tax Commission on 1954 sales. (Tr. 17) And
no tax has ever been paid for such sales. The essence of
the Petitioners' position is that they were not required
to pay any tax on their sales during 1954 because they
\Vere not engaged in business during 1955.
In their brief Petitioners distinguish the Mine Occupation Tax from a property tax, and they also argue that
it is not a severance tax. From this they infer that the
Mine Occupation Tax is a franchise tax, and that the tax
should be prepaid and, therefore, that they owed no tax
in 1955 based upon their sales during 1954, because they
were not engaged in business during 1955.
The Tax Commission agrees that the !fine Occupation Tax is not a. property tax and asserts that the requirements of the law regarding the advalorem property
4
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tax have no relevance in this case. Therefore, such cases
as Box Elder Co~tnty vs. Conley, 79 Utah 199, 284 Pac.
105; liVinton Lumber Co. vs. Shoshone County, 294 Pac.
529 (Idaho 1931); Fairlamb vs. Bowle, 71 P. 2d 417
(Colorado 1937) cited in Petitioners' brief on pages 9, 14
and 15 and the extract from 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Section 29, cited on page 7 of Petitioners' brief are not relevant to the determination of this case since they all
involve provisions of law relating solely to ad valorem
taxes.
The Tax Commission also contends that the Mine
Occupation Tax is not a franchise tax. It would appear
from the cases that a franchise tax or license tax is
often confused with an occupation tax. This was specifically recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in the
case of Provo City vs. Provo JJ!l eat and Packing Co., 49
Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479 Ann. Cas. 1918 D. 530. This
case states that a license or franchise tax is primarily
intended to regulate or prohibit a particular business,
while an occupation tax is primarily intended to raise
revenue. The same distinction was made in the case of
Hurt vs. Cooper, 110 S.W. 2d 896, 899, 900. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, an occupation tax is "to be distinguished from 'a license tax' which is a fee or exaction
for the privilege of engaging in the business, not for its
prosecution.'' See Black's Law Dictionary, Occupation
Tax, page 1,230 (4th Ed.). Corpus Juris Secundum also
distinguishes an occupation tax from a privilege tax as
follows:
5
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''Occupation tax - The term 'occupation tax,'
used as descriptive of a tax levied on the privilege
of carrying on a business or occupation, is sometimes also applied to a license fee or license tax.
It is in the nature of an excise tax.
"Privilege tax - A privilege tax is a tax
passed to raise revenue which is imposed on the
right to exercise a privilege; its payment is invariably a condition precedent to the exercise of the
privilege involved. Such a tax is in the nature of
an excise tax." (53 C.J.S., Licenses, Sec. 1 (C),
page 447.)
Adler vs. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539, 9 N.E. 672, 675,
distinguishes the two taxes as follows :
''The distinction between a tax upon a business [or an occupation tax], and what might be
termed a license, is that the former is exacted by
reason of the fact that the business is carried on,
and the latter is exacted as a condition precedent
to the right to carry it on. In the one case the individual may rightfully engage in and carry on the
business without paying a tax; in the other he
cannot.''
From the foregoing principles it will be seen that a
franchise tax is primarily intended to regulate or prohibit
particular businesses and that in keeping with this purpose the tax must be paid in advance. Pre-payment is
the means adopted to regulate, for if the tax is not paid
there is no privilege extended to do business and any
business done is illegal. On the other hand, an occupation
tax is primarily intended to raise revenue. The taxable
incident is the doing of business and the tax is measured
by the amount of business done. Since it is impossible to
determine the amount of the tax until after the business

6
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has been done, payment of tax is usually deferred until
after the close of the year in which the business is done.
This conclusion is consistent with the language of
the Utah Supreme Court interpreting the Mine Occupation Tax in the recent case of Consolidated Uranium
Mines Inc. vs. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 236, 240,
291 p. 2d 895, 898 :
"Although, it is true that a license fee or tax
may be, and usually is, required to be paid before
the business which is licensed may be carried on,
the legislature in our Mining Occupation Tax specifically provided that: 'Said tax shall be delinquent on the first day of June next succeeding the
calendar year when the ore or metal is sold.'
(Emphasis ours) This clearly indicates that the
legislature intended that the tax base should be on
the 'gross amount received for or the gross value
of metalliferous ore sold' and of course that cannot be ascertained until after the occurrence of
one of those events. Since the tax is not delinquent
until the first day of June next succeeding the
calendar year vvhen the ore or metal is sold, this
indicates that the tax is on the metal mined in the
year prior to the year in which the tax becomes
delinquent ... ''
Thus in this case it
Petitioners should have
sales of ore during 1954.
"\Vas ever paid the State
during 1954.

would appear that in 1955 the
paid a tax based upon their
The record is clear that no tax
of Utah for Petitioners' sales

Therefore, the State Tax Commission properly found
in its decision No. 166 that the Petitioners were engaged

7
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in the business of mining or selling ore during 1954 and
that they were persons who should have paid to the state
a Mine Occupation Tax in the year 1955.
POINT II
THE TAX IS NOT ILLEGAL:
(A) THE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE AS
PROVIDED BY LAW
(B) IT IS NOT 1\iAND.A.TORY THAT THE
TAX BE FIXED ON OR BEFORE
TI-IE DATE SPECIFIED IN THE
1\tfiNE OCCUPATION TAX.
Under point 2 of their argument Petitioners cite
the case of Moss, County Attorney, Ex Rel. State Tax
Commission, vs. Board of Comm,issioners of Salt Lake
City, et al, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961, for the proposition that the taxing authority must act within the scope
of the constitutional and legislative authority. This the
Tax Commission is willing to concede. Next, the Petitioners cite the Jensen Candy Case and the Norville Case
for the proposition that any ambiguities as to the intention of the legislature in enacting taxing statutes must
be resolYed strictly against the power to tax. The Tax
Commission 'vill also concede that this is a proper rule of
construction. Ho,vevPr, the Tax l~ommission contends
that in the present case there is no ambiguity or uncertainty as to 1he intention of the legislature to impose the
Mine Occupation Tax upon persons engaged in the business of mining or producing ore. Section 59-5-67, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, imposes a Mine Occupation Tax
8
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upon every person engaged in the business of mining or
producing ore. The record clearly indicates that the
Petitioners during 1954 were engaged as lessees in the
business of mining and producing and selling ore. (Tr.
16) They have not claimed otherwise. There can be no
dispute but what they were persons whom the legislature
intended to tax. The lease ( Tr. 84) shows that the property leased was a portion of a mining claim and that the
remainder of the claim was being worked by the lessor.
As lessees the Petitioners 'vere independent of the control of the lessors, and thus were persons engaged on
their own account in the business of mining during 1954.
The evidence also shows that Petitioners filed no statement with the Tax Commission (Tr. 16) as required by
Section 59-5-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Under this
same section, ''the statement or report required by this
section may be made by the owner of the mine or mining
claim from which the ore is extracted, irrespective of
\Yhether such property be operated directly by the owner
or be opera ted by one or more lessees, or otherwise ... ''
The record shows that the Commission assumed that the
statement of ores sold during 1954 which was filed by the
owner, in this case, Utex Exploration Company, included
sales of ore by the Petitioners. (Tr. 9) When it was
shown that the ore sold by Petitioners was not included
in the return furnished to the State Tax Commission by
Utex Exploration Company, the Tax Commission notified the Petitioners of the amounts due. (Tr. 39 and 40)
It would appear that the Petitioners' attack on the
validity of the tax amount claimed to be due resolves
9
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itself to two arguments: (1} That the tax was not
assessed as of the date which is provided by statute, and
(2) that the Tax Commission itself did not assess the
amount claimed to be due.
As to the first point, Sec. 59-5-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, says :
''Not later than the first Monday in May of
each year, the tax commission shall fix the amount
of occupation tax that each person shall pay. Immediately thereafter the person whose occupation
tax is so fixed shall be notified by mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to his last known place of residence, of the amount of the occupation tax so
fixed.''
Petitioners in their brief comment on page 13: "It
is generally held that where a statute fixes a time for
assessment such provisions are mandatory.'' Cooley in
his work on taxation has one chapter which is devoted to
the subject of mandatory and directory provisions of
tax statutes. In 2 Cooley on Taxation, Sec. 510, (4th Ed.
1924) he states as follo,vs :
''Many eminent judges have endeavored to
lay down a general rule on this subject, by "~hich
the difficulties in tax cases may in general be solved.
In one of the cases in which this has been attempted, the general doctrine is stated as follows:
'There are undoubtedly many statutory requisites
intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of
business evolved upon them, which do not limit
their power, or render its exercise in disregard of
the requisitions ineffectual. Such generally are
regulations designated to secure order, system, and
uispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of

10
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which the rights of parties interested cannot be
injuriously affected. Provisions of this character
are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless
accompanied by negative words, importing that
the act required shall not be done in any other
manner or time than that designated. But when
the requisitions prescribed are intended for the
protection of the citizen, and to prevent a sacrifice
of his property, and by a disregard of which his
rights might be and generally would be injuriously
affected, they are not directory but mandatory.
They must be followed, or the acts done will be
invalid. The power of the officer in all such cases
is limited by the measure and conditions prescribed for its exercise.' " (Citing French vs. Ed~vards, 13 Wall. [ 80 U. S.], 506, 511, 20 L. Ed.
702, 703.)
In the case cited, French owned a considerable
amount of land which was sold to Edwards' predecessor
in interest under a tax deed. The law in the State of
California in which the sale took place required the sheriff to sell ''only the smallest quantity that any purchaser
will take and pay the judgment and all costs.'' Instead,
the sheriff sold the whole tract, consisting of some 1300
acres, to the highest bidder. The court in its decision
argued that because of the relatively great value of the
property and the small amount of taxes due "it is
hardly credible that a less portion of the whole of this
large tract would not have been readily accepted and the
judgment and costs, amounting to only $155.40, been paid,
had any opportunity to take less than the entire tract
been afforded to purchasers." (French vs. Edwards, 13
Wall. [ 80 U. S.] 506, 513, 20 L Ed. 702, 704.) Therefore,
11
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the court found that a disregard of these provisions
amounted to a sacrifice of French's rights.
The case of State vs. Le(J!yt, 9 Wis. 279, 292, involved
the validity of a statute which was not published within
the time required by law to be published. In that case
the court said:
''We understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this: That where there is no
substantial reason why the thing to be done might
not as well be done after the time prescribed as
before-no presumption that by allowing it to be
so done it may work an injury or wrong-nothing
in the act itself, or in other acts relating to the
same subject matter, indicating that the legislature did not intend that it should rather be done
after the time prescribed than not to be done at all;
there the courts assume that the intent was, that if
not done within the time prescribed, it might be
done afterwards.''
The instant case is substantially different on its facts
from the case of French vs. Edwards, supra. In that
case it was clear that French's property interests were directly affected by the sheriff's failure to offer less than
the entire tract for sale for such a relatively small
amount. In the present case it is difficult to see wherein
the Petitioners' property interests are injured because
of the fact that this tax was assessed later than the date
prescribed by la,v. Petitioners in their brief on page 13
state as fo1lows:
'' r_rhe provisions of See. 59-5-73, supra, are
directly related to the taxpayer and is the only
section setting forth the manner in 'vhich he 'Yill

12
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be advised of the assessment. It is the procedure
by which he knows the property and activity being
taxed and the amount thereof. Further, it is the
only opportunity he ha.s to avoid penalty and interest charges. The taxpayer is subject to penalty and interest unless he pays his tax on or before June 1st, ordinarily a period of less than
thirty days.''
The facts of this case, however, disclose that the Petitioners are not injured in any of these particulars which
they set forth. They claim that this is the only section
setting forth the manner in which they will be advised
of the assessment, yet the evidence discloses that they
received a letter from the State Tax Commission stating
the amount claimed to be due. They claim that this is the
procedure by which they know the property and activity
being taxed and the amount thereof. The law requires
only the amount of the tax to be communicated to the taxpayer in this notice. Normally, the taxpayer furnishes a
return to the State Tax Commission whereby he discloses
the property and amount of his sales. Based on this
information the Tax Commission computes his tax and
notifies him thereof. In the instant case, the taxpayers
failed to furnish a return, but certainly they cannot claim
that they did not know which activity was being taxed.
The Petitioners further argue that this assessment is
the only opportunity which a taxpayer has to avoid penalty and interest charges. Yet Sec. 59-5-70, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, imposes a penalty of 25% of the tax for
failure to m.ake or file a return, and no penalty is provided for failing to pay the tax on time. However, interest at the rate of 6% is required to be charged by Sec.

13
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59-5-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, from the date the
tax is delinquent. An examination of Tax Commission
Decision No. 166 will disclose that in the instant case the
Petitioners are not being charged with either p~nalty or
interest on the amount due. They have only been assessed
the amount actually due as taxes to the State of Utah and
no added charge is put on for penalty or interest.
Therefore, it would appear that taxpayers' property
interests were not damaged because of the failure of the
Tax Commission to assess this amount and notify them
thereof on or before 1\Iay 1, 1955. Rather it would appear
from the facts of this case that there is no substantial
reason why the act required to be done could not be done
as well after the date set by statute as before the date set
by statute, for where no injury is suffered by the petitioning taxpayers, it would appear that the legislature
intended that it would rather have the act done late than
not to be done at all.
The taxpayers further argue that no assessment at
all was made. This argument was not raised by the taxpayers' petition to the State Tax Commission, and no
decision was made thereon in Tax Commission Decision
No. 166. Therefore, it would appear improper to now
raise the argument for the first time on appeal. Apart
from this, it would appear that according to the law a
formal assessment is not necessary. In the case of State
cJ; rel, Ricc-Stix Dry Goods Co. vs. Alf, 224 Mo. 493, 507,
123 S. W. 882, 885, the court stated as follows :
''The distinction bet,Yeen an ad valorem property tax and a strictly occupation or license tax
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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must be kept in view, to reach a proper settlement
of the controversy in these cases.
"When the state or a municipality by authority of the state, imposes a. license tax, it fixes the
amount, and there is no assessment or any need of
one ; neither is there any necessity for notice or a
hearing.''
It should be noted that all the cases cited by Petitioner as to the necessity of an assessment are cases
relating to ad valorem property tax wherein a formal
assessment may be a condition precedent to the right
to collect the tax. As pointed out in Point No. 1 these
cases have no bearing on a case involving the Mine Occupation Tax. Further, an examination of the statutes relating to the Mine Occupation Tax discloses that the word
"assessment" is never mentioned. Therefore, it would
appear that no assessment is necessary.
To the same effect also is 4 Cooley on Taxation,
Sec. 1676, (4th Ed. 1924), which distinguishes an occupation tax from a property tax.
''Whether a particular tax is on the one or the
other cannot be determined by the application of
any fixed rule. Ordinarily a tax imposed on the
carrying on of any business, trade, profession or
calling is not a tax on property as distinguished
from an occupation tax. Generally an assessment
of the tax is necessary in case of a property tax
but not in the case of an occupation tax.''
The only requirement of the Mine Occupation Tax
Statutes is contained in Sec. 59-5-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, wherein it says that the Tax Commission
15
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shall fix the amount of occupation tax which each person
shall pay.
There can be no susbtantial question in this case but
what the amount was fixed by the Tax Commission. A
letter notifying the Petitioner of the amount claimed to
be due was sent on Tax Commission stationery. It was
signed by the Executive Secretary of the Tax Commission. It set a definite amount and recited the statutes
of the State of Utah in connection with the collection of
the Mine Occupation Tax. There can be no question in
this case of the rrax Commission attempting to collect
from Petitioners a tax obligation owed by third parties,
inasmuch as the evidence clearly shows that Petitioners
were persons independently engaged in the business of
mining and, therefore, were properly subject themselves
to the 1\Iine Occupation Tax.
POINT III
THE ASSESSMENT WAS NOT CONTRARY
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.
The Utah State Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated U raniun~ ll:lines, Inc. vs. State Tax Commission,
4 Utah 2d, 236, 291 P. 2d 895, indicated the 'Yay in \Yhich
the year of payment of the Mine Occupation Tax relates
to the year of the taxable incident. The court stated:
''Although, it is true that a license fee or tax
may bP, and usually is, required to be paid before
the business "~hich is licensed may be carried on,
the legislature in our Mining Occupation Tax speci flea lly provided that : 'Said tax shall be delinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quent on the first day of June next succeeding the
calendar year when the ore or metal is sold.' (Emphasis ours) This clearly indicates that the legislature intended that the tax base should be on the
'gross amount received for or the gross value of
metalliferous ore sold' and of course that cannot
be ascertained until after the occurrence of one of
those events. Since the tax is not delinquent until
the first day of June next succeeding the calendar
year when the ore or metal is sold, this indicates
that the ta,x is on the metal mined in the year prior
to the year in which the tax becomes delinquent .... '' (Latter emphasis added)
It is also true that the court in continuing stated
as follows:
''therefore, an imposition of such a tax based
on sales other than those made in the calendar
year sought to be taxed violates the provisions of
the Act. The Tax Commission, therefore, erred
when it purported to base its assessment for the
year 1954 on sales made in the year 1953. ''
From this last quoted portion the taxpayers argue
that in the instant case the Tax Commission assessed the
tax ''for 1955,'' and that unless this is a tax upon metals
mined and sold during 1955, the assessment is on its face
invalid. The petitioners later contend that the statement
by the Tax Commission that this was based upon sales of
ore during 1954 is an afterthought. However, considering
all the circumstances, it would appear that in reality the
Petitioners' argument in this instance is the afterthought. The letter notifying Petitioners of the amount
claimed to be due was sent to them before the taxes would
be due on any ore which they may have sold during 1955.
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This would tend to prove that from the beginning the
only amount claimed by the Tax Commission was the tax
on the sales of ore made during 1954. It would seem that
the Petitioners have thought of this argument since the
decision in the Consolidated Case, published on Dec. 21,
1955, which was subsequent to the time when the notice
\Vas given to Petitioners.
The Tax Commission contends that the statement of
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah last quoted above
from the Consolidated Case was really dicta, particularly
if it be applied to the facts of this case. In that case the
taxpayer never argued that the tax was based upon the
\vrong year. In the Consolidated Case, supra, 4 Utah
2d at 239, the court stated as follows:
''Plaintiff also contends that the Commission
unlawfully used the production figures for the entire year of 1953 as a basis for the tax imposed because until October, 1953, under section 1809 (b)
of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1809
'* * * The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are expressly
exempted from taxation in any manner or form by
any state, * * *.' We agree.''
It therefore appears from the opinion in the Consolidated Case that the only thing \Yhich the taxpayer in that
case contended \Yas that it was exempt from taxation until
()c·tober, 1953. The taxpayer neYer contended that the
~rax Commission improperly assessed that tax as being
''for the yen r 1~1[)± based upon sales of ore during 1953. ''
The Seetions of the Utah Code relating to the Mine
Occupation Tax do not mention the necessity of tying the
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tax to any particular year. Therefore, to denominate the
Mine Occupation Tax as a tax due for a particular year
is merely a matter of convenience. It is not a matter so
substantial as to determine the validity of any amount
sought to be collected as Mine Occupation Tax for that
year. If a person engages in the business of mining during 1954 and sells ore during that same year, a taxable
incident has resulted, and it was the intention of the legislature to exact a tax from the prosecution of the business
of mining during that year. Whether that tax be denominated a tax for 1954 (the year of the sale) or a tax for
1955 (the year of the payment) is of no substantial difference, so long as the party being taxed understands
tl;lat he is being taxed on his sales during the preceding
year. In the instant case, although the notice to the
Petitioners stated that the tax was for the year 1955,
there is no allegation anywhere in the petitions or in the
evidence presented at the hearing before the Tax Commission that the Petitioners were in any way misled.
The evidence is to the contrary. The taxpayers in their
J.l\.mended Petition supplied the basis for the computation of the tax which \Vas ultimately adopted by the Tax
Commission. This was based upon their sales of ore
during 1954. In Taxpayers' Exhibit D (Tr. 105) we :find
the production figures for 1954 and the notation ''this
amount is now at issue.'' In addition it is clear that the
tax which should be paid on sales of ore during 1955
would not become delinquent until June of 1956. Since
the letter notifying Petitioners of the amount claimed
to be due was sent to them on Nov. 4, 1955, it is obvious
on the face of the letter that this could not relate to sales
19
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of ore during 1955. Therefore, Petitioners were not misled into thinking that they were being taxed for sales of
ore during a year in which they had no operations in the
state of Utah as they now claim. Furthermore, the holding in the Consolidated Case would seem to indicate that
it is proper to collect a Mine Occupation Tax in 1955
based upon sales of ore during 1954.
POINT IV
THE TAX WAS PROPERLY COl\iPUTED.
It would appear from the Petitioners' argument that
they are in reality advancing two arguments. The :first is
that Petitioners owe no tax because the primary tax liability is on the part of Utex, the lessor of the mining
property involved here, and not on the part of the lessee.
The second argument would appear to be that the State
Tax Commission improperly refused to allow Petitioners
a credit against the amount claimed to be due for an
overpayment of tax applicable against sales of ore during
1953. As to the :first argument, the position of the Tax
Commission is set out in Point II of this brief.
Concerning the actual computation of the amount
found to be due, Thfr. 1\tioffat, the accountant for the G. &
G. Mining Company, testied that during 1954 the Petitioners shipped ore to the buying station in the amount
of $1,352,080.95 (Tr. 62); that during the same year they
received as hauling allowance $105,640.27 (Tr. 62); and
tbnt during 1954 Petitioners incurred hauling expense in
the amount of $144,913.27 (Tr. 62). Adding together the
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amounts received for the ore and hauling allowance and
subtracting therefrom the amount of hauling expense
actually incurred and after deducting the specific allowance of $50,000, computing the tax at 1% of the net
amount so derived will produce a tax in the amount of
$12,628.08 which the Tax Commission found to be due.
The Petitioners cannot complain of this finding since
the amount was computed by using the figures which are
shown in Taxpayers' Exhibit D ( Tr. 105). These amounts
are the only figures which are relevant to a computation
of the tax owed for sales of ore during 1954.
Petitioners in their brief now argue that the Tax
Commission erred in not allowing them a credit for overpayment of the amount paid as tax based on sales of
ore during 1953. Yet at the hearing before the Tax Commission while Mr. Moffat, the accountant for G & G
Mining Company, was on the stand being cross-examined,
he was asked the following question:

"Q. And according to the books of the company,
what was the value of the ore shipped by the
taxpayer between Oct. 1, 1953, and Dec. 31,
1953, inclusive 1
Mr. Evans: I would object that there is no
issue as to that period of time, and on the
grounds that it is immaterial.'' (Tr. 55)
Later Mr. Moffat was asked as to the value of ore delivered to the purchaser during this same period of time and
the following colloquy resulted:
'' Q. So the values would be the same, the values
shipped and delivered 1

A. I would consider them the same, yes.
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Q. That is all I want to know. And the answer
would be the same for the value of the ore
delivered to the purchaser from October 1,
1953 to Dec. 31, 1953 ~
Mr. Evans: I have the same objection as to
that question.'' (Tr. 56)
Subsequently Mr. Moffat was asked:

"Q. And how much was received for hauling allowance between Oct. 1, 1953 and Dec. 31,
1953 regardless of when received~
1\1r. Evans: I object to that as being immaterial; there is no issue as to that." {Tr. 60)
Finally Mr. Moffat was asked:

'' Q. Now how much did it cost the taxpayer to
ship the ore which he shipped between Oct.l,
1953, and Dec. 31, 1953, regardless of when
he paid it~
Mr. Evans: I object to the question as immaterial. There is no issue as to that period of
time." (Tr. 61)
In view of the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
the Consolidated Case, supra, it would appear that the
Petitioners may have paid too much as Mine Occupation
Tax for their sales of ore during 1953 since the amount
paid as tax was based upon their sales during the entire
year. However, inasmuch as the tax was not paid under
protest, it 'vould appear that there is no way the Tax
Commission could refund the overpayment. The Tax
Commission \\Tould not object to allo\\1"ing Petitioners a
credit for overpayment of this tax to be applied against
tht~ir tax in subsequent years. Ho,veYer, no,vhere in the
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Taxpayers' Petition or Amended Petition does there appear a request that such a credit be allowed, and as outlined above, at the hearing, counsel for Petitioners objected four times to the introduction of testimony which
would have enabled the Commission to determine the
amount properly due the state, in the event the Petitioners should later apply for a credit.
Should this court decide that it is proper to allow
the Petitioners a credit for overpayment of taxes based
on sales of ore during 1953 regardless of the foregoing
objections, the Tax Commission would like to bring one
matter to the attention of the court. In Taxpayers' Exhibit D (Tr.105), the taxpayers assert that the amount of
the overpayment is $6,418.50. In Petitioners' brief, on
page 20, Petitioners allege that the overpayment is in the
amount of $7,904.01. The reason for the discrepancy bet"Teen these two figures is not clear, and the testimony
given by Mr. Moffat at the hearing will not substantiate
either figure. At the hearing Mr. Moffat testified that
the value of the ore shipped by the taxpayers prior to
October 1, 1953, was $641,850.45. (Tr. 54) He later testified that the hauling allowance received by the Petitioners
on ore delivered prior to Oct. 1, 1953, was in the amount
of $28,601.57. (Tr. 60) These two amounts when added
together produce a gross receipt in the amount of $670,452.02. Mr. Moffat then testified that the actual hauling
expense incurred by the taxpayers prior to October 1,
1953, was in the amount of $38,135.43. (Tr. 61) Deducting
this figure from the gross receipt produces a net receipt
of $632,316.59. Even allowing the Petitioners to apply the
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full $50,000 statutory exemption against the taxable portion of the year, rather than making them allocate the
$50,000 exemption over the entire year would produce a
taxable amount for the portion of 1953 prior to Oct. 1st in
the amount of $6,323.17. This is the maximum amount
which the testimony indicates the taxpayers overpaid on
their sales of ore during 1953. The amount which Mr.
Moffat arrived at in computing the overpayment on Taxpayers' Exhibit D is greater than the amount found
through the evidence at the hearing because Mr. Moffat,
through the process which he used, applied the net hauling expense for the entire year to the taxable portion of
the year, rather than to allocate the expense between
the taxable and non-taxable portion of the year. Should
this court find that a credit should be allowed, the expense
at least should be allocated between the taxable and nontaxable portion of the year as it was actually incurred,
rather than allowing the petitioning taxpayers to charge
their expenses for the non-taxable portion of the year
against income for the taxable portion of the year. The
net tax then due the state for the two years would be the
amount of $6,405.72 instead of the $1,604.48 alleged by
Petitioners on Page 20 of their brief. Should the Court
find that the exemption also should be pro-rated, the net
tax due the state for the two years \Yould be $6,680.72.
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CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the Tax
Commission properly found that the Petitioners were
subject to Mine Occupation Tax in the amount of
$12,628.08, and moves that this Honorable Court affirm
Tax Commission Decision No. 166.
Respectfully Submitted,

JOHN MARSHALL and
BEN RAWLINGS,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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